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Abstract
Using ￿rm level panel data from the U.S., I explore the relationship between ￿rm size and R&D
productivity for two important and R&D-intensive industries: Semiconductors and Pharmaceu-
ticals. I employ two measures of a ￿rm￿ s R&D performance: the number of citations received
per patented innovation, and the number of citations received per dollar of R&D expenditures.
The former is a measure of the average quality of a ￿rm￿ s patents, and the latter is a measure of
total R&D output obtained per dollar of investments. I ￿nd that the average quality of patents
(citations received per patent) falls with ￿rm size in Pharmaceuticals, but there is no relation-
ship between patent quality and ￿rm size in Semiconductors. Citations received per R&D dollar
decrease with size in both industries, which is due to the well-documented negative relationship
between patents per R&D and ￿rm size.
Keywords: R&D Productivity, Firm size, Patents, Citations, Semiconductors, Pharmaceuti-
cals, Panel data.
11 INTRODUCTION
The Schumpeterian hypothesis has been a source of much heated debate among economists. While
some economists, starting with Schumpeter (1942), claimed that large enterprises are the primary
engines of innovation and economic growth, others found evidence for both small-￿rm and large-
￿rm advantages in innovation. The presence of large ￿xed costs in innovation (Galbraith, 1952),
economies of scale and scope in R&D (Galbraith, 1952; Comanor, 1967), bene￿ts of diversi￿ed
product lines (Nelson, 1959), ability to spread the risks (Nelson, 1959) and costs (Cohen & Klepper,
1996) of R&D projects, easier access to external ￿nancing (Galbraith, 1952; Rothwell, 1989), and
possible advantages in the scienti￿c labor market (Idson & Oi, 1999; Kim, Lee & Marschke, 2009a)
are commonly stated factors favoring large ￿rm productivity. On the other hand, small ￿rms may
have advantages in performing R&D due to a (comparative) lack of bureaucracy (Scherer, 1980;
Cooper, 1964; Blair, 1972), ￿ exible decision making processes (Freeman & Soete, 1997; Rothwell,
1989) and a lack of the agency problems that may occur due to the incontractibility of the output of
a single scientist in large ￿rms (Lewis & Yao, 2001). Small ￿rms are also argued to have better R&D
performances since they tend to be more e¢ cient receivers of spillovers (Acs, Audretsch & Feldman,
1994; Audretsch & Vivarelli, 1994; Shimshoni, 1970). Since it is possible to state reasons for higher
productivity in both small and large ￿rms, the ￿nal verdict on the Schumpeterian hypothesis needs
to come from empirical research (Scherer, 1980).
In this article I perform an empirical test of the Schumpeterian hypothesis on two important
R&D-intensive industries in the U.S: Pharmaceuticals and semiconductors. For this purpose I use
two di⁄erent (but related) measures of a ￿rm￿ s R&D output: the number of citations received per
patented innovation, and the number of citations received per dollar of R&D expenditures. The
former is meant as a proxy for the average quality of ￿rm￿ s patents, while the latter is a proxy for
total output achieved per dollar of R&D investments.
Focusing on individual industries has the advantage that economic units are technologically
similar, thus citation counts belonging to di⁄erent ￿rms are comparable with one another. This, of
course, comes at the cost of losing generality since we have to make inferences about relatively nar-
row industry classi￿cations. An empirical analysis of larger magnitude that spans a large number of
industry classi￿cations needs to take additional caution to ensure that cross-industry di⁄erences in
citation (and patenting) rates are not driving the main results. Such an e⁄ort is undertaken by Din-
daroglu (2010), who addresses the same research question using a large panel of U.S. manufacturing
2￿rms, and discusses some of these issues in further detail.
2 BACKGROUND
The relationship between ￿rm size and R&D performance is among the most intensely debated
questions in the economics of innovation. R&D performance is traditionally measured by patents
(or patents per R&D dollar), or innovation counts. While there are con￿ icting results, the literature
at large does not support the Schumpeterian hypothesis, and often ￿nds evidence on the contrary.
In an in￿ uential paper, Scherer (1965) studied the relationship between patenting and ￿rm size for
the 1955 cross section of the largest ￿rms in U.S. He found that the number of patents increased less
than proportionally with ￿rm size for most of the sample, with the exception of a small number of
very large ￿rms. Bound et al (1984) found that smaller ￿rms obtained a larger number of patents
per dollar of R&D expenditures in a 1976 cross section of U.S. manufacturing ￿rms. Similar
results have been found by Johannisson and Lindstrom (1971) in Swedish, and by Schwalbach and
Zimmerman (1991) in German manufacturing. Therefore, such results are not con￿ned to the U.S.
Some authors have utilized databases of signi￿cant innovations to study the relationship be-
tween ￿rm size and innovation counts1 . Pavitt, Robson & Townsend (1987) used the database of
signi￿cant innovations compiled by the Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) of the University of
Sussex to show that there is a U-shaped relationship between size and innovation intensity. Acs &
Audretsch (1991a) concluded that the data supported the hypothesis of a negative innovation-￿rm
size relationship as a general rule, while Audretsch and Acs (1991) found a negative relationship
between ￿rm size and the number of innovations per employee2.
The problems with using patents as indicators of innovative performance are well-documented
(see, for instance, Griliches 1990). Most importantly, patent counts (or stocks) treat all patents
as identical, which can be greatly misleading (Cohen & Levin, 1989; Acs & Audretsch, 1991b).
Studies that use patents as indicators of inventive activity are also problematic due to the observed
heterogeneity in propensities to patent across industries (Scherer, 1983). Thus, it is usually not
clear whether results are due to di⁄erences in R&D productivity or di⁄erences in propensities to
patent across economic units. The use of R&D expenditures is additionally problematic due to the
1For a detailed discussion on these databases, see Acs & Audretsch (1990).
2For extensive surveys of the literature between size and innovation, see Symenoidis (1996), Cohen (1995), and
Cohen & Levin (1989), as well as the volumes by Acs & Audretsch (1990, 1991b) and Kamien & Schwartz (1982).
Scherer (1980, Ch.15) provides an early but excellent discussion on the topic.
3bias in reported R&D. This problem is especially pronounced for small ￿rms (Kleinknecht, 1989).
Returns to R&D, or R&D-weighted output indicators can therefore be biased, and spurious results
may emerge due to the underreporting of R&D by small ￿rms.
The use of innovation counts, on the other hand, fails to account for the variation in the quality
of innovations in a systematic way. Hence, this approach mirrors the traditional treatment of
patents and R&D dollars as homogenous units, thus inherits the problems therein. It is possible
that there are important quality-quantity trade-o⁄s in innovation. That is, even though large ￿rms
obtain patented innovations less frequently, it is possible that their patents are of higher quality.
In other words, large-￿rm advantages in innovation may be favorable to the quality of innovations
rather than their quantity. This possibility sheds additional doubt on previous results that are
obtained using patent and innovation counts as output indicators. Hence, it needs to be properly
examined.
This chapter addresses this very issue by employing two measures of a ￿rm￿ s R&D output
that have not been previously employed in this line of research. These are the average number of
citations received by a company￿ s patents, i.e., citations per patent (Citations/Patents; henceforth
CP), and citations received per R&D dollar spent (Citations/R&D Expenditures; henceforth CR).
CP is meant as a proxy for the average quality of a ￿rm￿ s patented innovations, while CR is a
measure of the total value generated per dollar of R&D inputs. It is well established that the
number of citations made to a given patent is a proxy for its quality (see Trajtenberg, 1990, and
the literature that follows). Another important advantage of using CP as an output measure is
that it avoids the previously mentioned problems with reported R&D expenditures. Also, studying
the variation in CP o⁄ers a means to look at innovative output net of the propensity to patent. On
the other hand, an important weakness of using CP and CR in the current context is that we do
not observe citations for innovations that do not lead to patenting for various reasons. Thus, these
measures also inherit some weaknesses of patent data. It should also be noted that CP is a direct
indicator of patent quality, while CR is not. This is because CR is highly correlated with patents
obtained per R&D dollar, which is not necessarily the case for CP. Most granted patents receive at
least one citation (while very few receive many), which implies that the total number of citations
is highly in￿ uenced by the total number of patents at the ￿rm level.
The use of patent citations is now common practice in the economics of innovation. In addition,
a small number of authors have used citation data in order to study the relationship between ￿rm
size and innovative output. Plehn-Dujowich (2009) ￿nds that patents and citations received per
4R&D stock falls with ￿rm size in a cross section of 1976 patents. Huang & Chen (2010), while
studying the relationship between R&D performance and technological diversi￿cation, control for
￿rm size in their regressions and ￿nd that the number of citations received by a ￿rm￿ s patents
increase with ￿rm size at a decreasing rate. This ￿nding implies that citations received per R&D
dollar falls with ￿rm size. These papers are similar to the current one in their use of citations
as proxies for R&D output. However, neither paper attempts to use a quality indicator that is
independent of the sizes of patent cohorts. As a result, their analyses that use citations do not
provide qualitatively di⁄erent results than their analyses using patent counts. A similar caution also
emerges from Lanjuow & Schankerman (2004), who construct an index of patent quality by taking
the common factor of ￿ve patent characteristics, including the number of citations received and
made. In their analyses, their patent quality index does not behave much di⁄erently than simple
patent counts unless average patent quality is taken into account rather than total quality. To
repeat, total citation counts are not very good indicators of the quality of a ￿rm￿ s innovations since
citation counts are highly correlated with patent counts at the ￿rm level. I study the determinants
of citations received per patent, which is a more direct indicator of quality, and is more useful to
capture possible quality-quantity trade-o⁄s in innovation. Also note that CP is used as a measure
of patent quality in di⁄erent contexts by Ernst (1998) and Narin (2006).
2.1 Pharmaceutical and Semiconductor Industries
Pharmaceutical and semiconductor industries have been fertile ground to test various hypotheses
in the economics of innovation due to their dependence on innovation, and their importance for the
U.S. economy. Large ￿rms have dominant roles in both industries, mergers have been increasingly
common, but the number of small ￿rms has also been increasing during the period under study
in the current paper (Graves & Langowitz, 1993; Hall & Ziedonis, 2007; Demirel & Mazzucato,
forthcoming). Thus, whether these industries exhibit economies or diseconomies of scale in inno-
vation has been extremely relevant. The pharmaceutical industry has been studied relatively more
extensively due to data availability. Comanor (1965) found evidence for scale economies for the
lower end of the size distribution of pharmaceutical ￿rms, but scale diseconomies for the higher
end. On the other hand, Vernon & Gusen (1974) and Schwartzman (1976) reported signi￿cant
economies of scale. Graves & Langowitz (1992, 1993) found evidence for decreasing returns to scale
in pharmaceutical R&D in the production of new chemical entities and the number of innovations.
Jensen (1987) found that ￿rm size did not a⁄ect the marginal productivity of R&D e⁄orts beyond
5a certain size threshold. Henderson & Cockburn (1996) ￿nd large ￿rms to be more productive in
R&D due to economies of scale and scope. In subsequent work, the same authors report size ad-
vantages to be primarily due to scope, rather than scale economies (Cockburn & Henderson, 1996).
Dimasi, Grabowski & Vernon (1995) use project-level data obtained from 12 U.S. pharmaceutical
companies to claim that the cost of new drug development decreases with ￿rm size, while sales per
marketed drug falls with size. In a recent article, Plotnikova (2010) adds to this by showing that
scale economies are present in pharmaceuticals during the initial stages of drug development (i.e.,
the development of new ideas), but large scale is detrimental to project success during later stages
(i.e., actual product development).
Empirical literature on the semiconductor industry in the current context lags behind that
for pharmaceuticals. In an article highly related to the current one, Kim & Marschke (2009)
show that patents per dollar of R&D expenditures decline with ￿rm size in U.S. semiconductor and
pharmaceutical industries. Rothwell (1984, 1989) emphasizes the role of small ￿rms in this industry
and makes a case for the importance complementarities between small and large ￿rms. Saxenian
(1994) argues that spin-o⁄s and the mobility of talented personnel have been responsible for the
success of the semiconductors industry (and the Silicon Valley at large). Hall & Ziedonis (2001)
undertakes a detailed empirical analysis of patenting in semiconductors, with particular attention
to the patenting motives and outcomes of small and large ￿rms.
3 EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY
The main interest of the chapter is the size e⁄ects in innovation. To this end, I estimate the
following empirical model:
yit = ￿S logSit + x0
it￿ + ￿i + ￿t + uit (1)
where yit is a measure of the R&D productivity of ￿rm i at year t, Sit is de￿ ated sales and xit
is a vector of controls for ￿rm i at year t. These controls will be introduced below. The error
term contains an unobservable and time-invariant ￿rm e⁄ect (￿i), as well as year e⁄ects (￿t).
Equation (1) will be estimated separately for CP and CR, using each as an alternative measure of
productivity. Both measures are used after a (natural) logarithmic transformation. The double-log
form provides better ￿t to data according to a Box-Cox test, thus this functional form is adopted
for all speci￿cations..
63.1 Independent Variables
I condition the relationship between R&D productivity (the logarithm of CP or CR) and ￿rm size
(the logarithm of sales) on a number of independent variables. These include ￿rm characteristics,
the characteristics of the ￿rm￿ s R&D organization and those of its patented innovations, as well as
some aspects of the ￿rm￿ s industrial and technological environment. All speci￿cations include the
logarithm of R&D intensity. This is de￿ned as the ratio of R&D stock to sales, where the former
is calculated using the perpetual inventory method using a 15% depreciation rate. R&D intensity
is an indicator of a ￿rm￿ s dedication to innovation, hence a potentially important determinant of
the rate and quality of the ￿rm￿ s innovative output. I also control for (the logarithm of) capital-
labor ratio since this variable may be a confounder in the size-innovation relationship. This ratio
is found by dividing net capital assets by the number of employees (in thousands). Firms with
a more capital-oriented production technology are argued to be more vulnerable against patent
infringement (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001; Kim, Lee & Marschke, 2009b) therefore may have di⁄erent
incentives for innovation and patenting. When the dependent variable is log (CP), I also control the
￿rm￿ s patent-R&D ratio (henceforth PR), which accounts for the variation in ￿rms￿patent yields
per dollar of current R&D investments. This allows me to evaluate the determinants of patent
quality, holding the ￿rm￿ s patenting practices constant.
3.1.1 Technological Diversi￿cation
A number of variables are constructed using aspects of ￿rms￿patenting activities. Most important
among these is a measure of the diversi￿cation of research activity at the ￿rm level, which is
calculated using the set of technological classes the ￿rm patents in. There is a growing literature
on the e⁄ects of technological diversi￿cation on R&D performance. Granstrand & Oskarsson (1994)
show that greater diversi￿cation is associated with greater sales and R&D growth. Miller (2006)
￿nds that diversi￿cation is positively associated with a number of performance measures. Nesta &
Saviotti (2005), Leten, Belderbos & Van Looy (2007) and Garcia-Vega (2006) ￿nd that technological
diversi￿cation is positively associated with the number of patents granted to the ￿rm. Huang &
Chen (2010) discover an inverted-U shaped relationship between technological diversity and the
number of patents, and citations made to these patents.
In order to contribute to this literature, I include a measure of technological diversi￿cation as an
independent variable. The measure of research diversi￿cation I use is one minus the concentration of
7the ￿rm￿ s patenting activity across di⁄erent technological classes, where concentration is calculated
using the Her￿ndahl index. That is,







where k 2 f1;:::;Kg are United States Patent and Trademark O¢ ce (USPTO) technology classes,
Pk
it is the number of patents that ￿rm i applied for in year tand was classi￿ed in technology
class k, and Pit is the total number of it patents. A more diverse research activity that spans
a large number of technological ￿elds will cause the ￿rm￿ s patents to be spread out among a
larger number of technological classi￿cations, which motivates this diversi￿cation measure. Note
that similar measures of diversi￿cation have been employed by previous researchers. Huang &
Chen (2010) and Leten Belderbos & Van Looy (2007) use a similarly constructed Her￿ndahl-based
index, while Garcia-Vega (2006) uses an index that is based on the entropy index of concentration.
Granstrand & Oskarsson (1994) employ both. Both the Her￿ndahl and entropy indexes are indexes
of concentration, hence serve a similar purpose.
Increased diversi￿cation may dilute the resources available to each technological activity. Hence,
diversi￿cation is costly, and it is possible that a ￿rm can be "too diversi￿ed". To account for this
possibility, I employ a quadratic polynomial for this variable. This will allow me to see whether too
much diversi￿cation is indeed detrimental for productivity, even if diversi￿cation is productivity
enhancing initially.
3.1.2 Basicness (Generality) of Patents
In addition, I control for a measure of the average basicness of the ￿rm￿ s patented innovations. This
variable is included to control for the variation in the types of innovations patented by di⁄erent
￿rms, which may have implications for citation patterns. The basicness of patented innovations is
measured by the index of generality constructed by Trajtenberg, Henderson & Ja⁄e (2002), which is
based on citations made to the original patent and their decomposition into di⁄erent technological
classes. Suppose that patent p receives a total of Np citations, Npk of which come from patents in
technological class k 2 f1;:::;Kg. Generality index for patent p is de￿ned as




I take the average generality for all it patents to get the generality score for ￿rm i￿ s year t patents.
Trajtenberg et al (2002) validate this measure by comparing a matched sample of university and
8corporate patents, and noting that patents granted to universities score higher than corporate
patents on this scale. Thus, the average generality of it patents measures to what extent the research
undertaken within the ￿rm is science-oriented, as opposed to applied product development.
3.1.3 Spillovers
Spillovers may play di⁄erent roles in small and large ￿rm innovation (Audretsch & Feldman, 1994;
Audretsch & Vivarelli, 1994). Therefore, it is also useful to directly control for spillover e⁄ects. To





where Rjt denotes the R&D expenditures of ￿rm j during year ; and wij is a measure of the
technological proximity between ￿rms i and j. I follow Ja⁄e (1986) and construct wij as follows.
Let Ti be a K-dimensional vector that contains the number of patents of ￿rm i that are classi￿ed
in USPTO technology class k 2 f1;:::;Kg in its kth element. This can be called the technological
position vector of ￿rm i. The technological proximity between ￿rms i and j (wij) is de￿ned as the
uncentered correlation between vectors Ti and Tj. Additional properties of this distance metric are
discussed in Ja⁄e (1986). The spillover measure is lagged one year.
3.1.4 Technological Opportunity
Finally, to capture the e⁄ects of technological opportunity, I include the annual growth of the
total R&D expenditures in the ￿rm￿ s technological neighborhood as an independent variable. This
variable is calculated as the annual growth of the total weighted R&D annual expenditures of all
external ￿rms where weights are the technological distance metrics constructed above.
3.2 Data and the Sample
All data on patents and citations are taken from the NBER patents and citations data ￿le (Hall,
Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg, 2001). All data on annual R&D expenditures, sales, and other ￿rm level
variables are taken from the historical Compustat panel compiled by the same authors. The stock
of R&D expenditures is calculated as a perpetual inventory using an annual depreciation rate of
15%. The procedure outlined in Hall, Ja⁄e and Trajtenberg (2001) is used to correct for the e⁄ect
of time truncation in the arrival of citations. This method is based on an estimate of the citation
9lag distribution. When an estimate of the lag distribution of citations is available, one can estimate
the true citation count for an age-a patent by dividing the raw (observed) citation count by the
fraction of citations an average patent receives during the ￿rst a years after application year. All
raw citation counts are corrected using the estimated weights given in tables 6 through 8 of the same
study. Note that this procedure is valid only for patents that have received citations for a signi￿cant
number of years, since estimation of lifetime citations become unreliable as one approaches the ￿nal
year citation data is available. For instance, a patent classi￿ed under ￿Drugs & Medical￿receives
2:6% of its lifetime citations during the ￿rst year, and 6:7% of its lifetime citations during the ￿rst
two years after patent application. The corresponding percentages are 4:8% and 11:5% for a patent
classi￿ed under ￿Electrical & Electronic￿ . Predicting total citations from such small percentages
of observed citation counts can be misleading. I leave a nine year window between the ￿nal year
used in this study (application year 1993) and the ￿nal year there is citation data available (2002).
On average, patents receive about half of their lifetime citations during the ￿rst nine years after
application.
Tables 1 and 2 should be placed about here
All variables in current dollar values are de￿ ated using the GNP de￿ ator. After deleting large
outliers and ￿rms with only a single year in the data, I am left with unbalanced panel of 362
observations for pharmaceuticals and an unbalanced panel of 310 observations for semiconductors,
both covering a period of 24 years between 1969 and 1992. Sample statistics are provided in Table
1 (pharmaceuticals) and Table 2 (semiconductors).
4 RESULTS
4.1 Citations per Patent
I begin by reporting estimates of equation (1) that take log (CP) as the dependent variable. Tables
3 and 4 report regression estimates for the baseline regression for pharmaceuticals and semiconduc-
tors, respectively. Recall that CP is a proxy for the average quality of a ￿rm￿ s patents, while CR
is a proxy for the total R&D output per R&D dollar invested. In other words, CP can be taken as
an indicator of quality, while CR can be considered as an indicator of quantity. Therefore, we also
get the opportunity to study the possibility of quality-quantity trade-o⁄s in innovation.
Table 3 provides estimates from ￿xed e⁄ects OLS regressions for the sample of pharmaceuticals.
Column 1 in this table provides coe¢ cient estimates for equation (1) controlling for permanent ￿rm
10e⁄ects, while column 2 introduces year e⁄ects in addition to ￿rm e⁄ects. While it is important to
control for year e⁄ects, this may also hinder the estimation of coe¢ cients for which the independent
variable is relatively stable over time. Therefore, initial estimates (columns 1 in all tables) ignore
year e⁄ects, which are introduced in later regressions (columns 2 and 3 in all tables). Column 3
estimates the same speci￿cation in column 2, but uses the number of non-self citations instead
of total citations while constructing CP. While both self citations and non-self citations can be
considered important indicators of patent value, using non-self cites has the additional property
that it measures the external "impact" of a ￿rm￿ s patents. Results in this column should be treated
as complementary to those in columns 1 and 2. Table 4 contains estimates from regressions identical
to those in Table 3, but for the sample of ￿rms in the semiconductors industry.
Table 3 should be placed about here
In all reported regressions in Table 3, the coe¢ cient of log(Sales) is negative and statistically
signi￿cant. Therefore, we see that average patent quality falls with ￿rm size in the pharmaceutical
industry. This is in contrast to the results we get in Table 4 for semiconductors. According to
the estimates in Table 4, the coe¢ cient of log(Sales) is positive in column 1, negative in columns
2 and 3, but it is statistically indistinguishable from zero at all at all reasonable levels of signif-
icance. Therefore, we conclude that ￿rm size is not a determinant of average patent quality in
semiconductors.
Regarding remaining variables of interest, we ￿nd that increased R&D intensity has a negative
e⁄ect on CP in both industries (in both Table 3 and Table 4). This implies that there are decreasing
returns to R&D dollars in both industries in terms of the total value generated by R&D inputs.
Table 4 should be placed about here
Patent/R&D ratio has a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient in Table 3 (pharmaceuticals), but
its coe¢ cient is statistically insigni￿cant in all columns of Table 4. That is, the marginal patent
seems to be of lower quality than the average patent in pharmaceuticals, but there is no such
relationship between average and marginal patent quality in semiconductors. The capital-labor
ratio has negative coe¢ cients in all columns in Table 3, has positive coe¢ cients in all columns in
Table 4, while all of these coe¢ cients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. Thus, I ￿nd no
e⁄ect of a ￿rm￿ s capital intensity on patent quality.
While generality has a positive e⁄ect on CP (and CP, non-self) for both industries, the impact
of technological diversi￿cation is di⁄erent for pharmaceuticals and semiconductors. In Table 3,
11the coe¢ cients of the quadratic speci￿cation of diversi￿cation are statistically insigni￿cant at the
5% level of signi￿cance. Hence, diversi￿cation is found to have no signi￿cant impact on patent
quality in the pharmaceutical industry. For semiconductors (Table 4), the estimated coe¢ cients
of the quadratic speci￿cation of the diversi￿cation measure are consisted with an inverted-U type
relationship between CP and diversi￿cation. That is, increased diversi￿cation causes patent quality
to increase up to a certain level, after which diversi￿cation impedes patent quality. On the other
hand, this result is lost when self-citations are excluded from the citation measure (Table 4, column
3). When self-citations are excluded, we still observe the inverted-U pattern, but the polynomial
terms are signi￿cant only at the 10% level of signi￿cance.
Regarding remaining variables of interest, technological opportunity and spillovers have positive
impacts on CP in the pharmaceutical industry (Table 3, column 1). However, the signi￿cance of
these coe¢ cients is lost when year e⁄ects are included (Table 3, columns 2 and 3). Neither variable
has a signi￿cant impact in the semiconductor industry in any speci￿cation. It is natural that
estimating the e⁄ect of technological opportunity while controlling for both ￿rm and year e⁄ects
proves di¢ cult, as little variation is left in this variable after these e⁄ects are accounted for. For
this variable, it may be more desirable to put faith in the estimates in column 1 for both industries
(Tables 3 and 4), which implies a positive e⁄ect for both variables in pharmaceuticals, but no
signi￿cant e⁄ect in semiconductors.
4.2 Citations per R&D Dollar
In Tables 5 and 6 I explore the determinants of citations received per R&D dollar. The dependent
variable in these regressions is the logarithm of CR. Table 5 reports results for the pharmaceutical
industry, while Table 6 contains estimates for the semiconductor industry. Recall that CR has
the interpretation of the total R&D output achieved per dollar of investments. The progression
of estimates in Tables 5 and 6 is similar to that in Tables 3 and 4; I ￿rst estimate equation (1)
using ￿xed e⁄ects OLS (column 1), then introduce year e⁄ects to the same speci￿cation (column 2).
Column 3 includes estimates for the same regression equation in column 2 except that self-citations
are excluded when CR is calculated (we called this variable CR, non-self).
Table 5 should be placed about here
The most important result here is that log(Sales) has a negative and signi￿cant coe¢ cient in
all speci￿cations. Therefore, CR falls with ￿rm size in both industries considered. This parallels
12previous results on the dependence of patent per R&D on ￿rm size (Acs & Audretsch, 1991a; Kim,
Lee & Marschke, 2009a; Bound et al, 1984). R&D intensity has a negative coe¢ cient in all columns
as well, mirroring the results presented in Tables 3 and 4.
Capital-labor ratio has an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient in most columns, though it does have a
negative and statistically signi￿cant e⁄ect on ￿non-self CR￿for semiconductors (Table 6, column3).
This coe¢ cient is signi￿cant only at the 10% level of signi￿cance in column 2 of the same table,
where the dependent variable is log (CR). These observations are in line with the arguments of Hall
& Ziedonis (2001) that large, capital intensive semiconductor ￿rms began patenting their "latent",
previously unpatented innovations, and strategically patented around already existing designs since
the beginning of 1980s. These patents are expected to have lower quality and impact. Similar to
previous estimates, generality has a positive coe¢ cient in all speci￿cations.
Technological diversi￿cation a⁄ects CR positively according to all estimates. Interestingly, the
relationship between diversi￿cation and CR is linear for pharmaceuticals (where the squared term
has an insigni￿cant coe¢ cient), but it is quadratic for semiconductors (where only the squared
term has an signi￿cant coe¢ cient). I ￿nd a positive e⁄ect of technological opportunity for phar-
maceuticals (column 2 of Table 5), but no such e⁄ect for semiconductors (Table 6). Spillovers, on
the other hand, a⁄ect CR positively for both industries (with the exception of column 3 of Table
5), but has no signi￿cant impact on CP. This suggests that spillovers are helpful mostly during the
development of new ideas, but do not necessarily improve the success of existing projects. In other
words, quantity seems to bene￿t from externally produced knowledge, but quality is determined
mostly by in-house research e⁄orts.
Table 6 should be placed about here
4.3 Discussion
Coming back to the main research question of the paper, my results indicate that small ￿rms pro-
duce higher quality patents in pharmaceuticals (higher CP), while also producing higher patent
value per dollar invested in R&D (higher CR). For the semiconductor industry, I ￿nd no signif-
icant di⁄erence in the average patent quality of small and large ￿rms. These results are true
holding constant key ￿rm characteristics (capital-labor ratio, R&D intensity), characteristics of
￿rm technology (diversi￿cation, generality) and aspects of the ￿rm￿ s technological and industrial
environment (spillovers, technological opportunity).
13Considering these ￿ndings in conjunction with those of the previous literature on the size-
innovation relationship, my results add valuable insights into these two industries. The ￿nding
that patent quality is higher for small ￿rms in pharmaceuticals are in line with previous research
on the di⁄erent stages of drug development in this industry. Drug development occurs through
several stages, with the average drug being developed over a period of 10 to 15 years, including
FDA review (Plotnikova, 2010). Patenting occurs at a very early phase during these stages, but
failure in later stages is common. Lower patent quality in large ￿rms may be due to the fact
that large ￿rms take on a large number of simultaneous development projects and have higher
failure rates at later stages, as stressed by Plotnikova (2010). This is possible if the ￿rm needs to
diversify into more risky research areas as the number of development projects increase. Hence,
many patents that large ￿rms obtain during earlier stages of development belong to projects that
fail during later stages, leaving the ￿rm with low-quality patents for its dead-end e⁄orts. These
observations are supported by the ￿ndings of Dimasi, Grabowski & Vernon (1995), i.e., that the
cost of new drug development decreases, but sales per marketed drug falls with ￿rm size. Their
former ￿nding implies that there are incentives for large ￿rms to take on riskier projects as they
diversify, while the latter is in line with lower success and lower patent quality, even if the project
leads to the marketing of a drug.
The result that small semiconductor ￿rms obtain patents that are not inferior in quality than
those of large ￿rms is meaningful when the organization of this industry is taken into account.
The technological base of this industry is highly complex and the development of a product often
requires the use interdependent, complementary technologies. While large ￿rms hold dominant
positions in the manufacturing and distribution of new technologies, small, specialized ￿rms are
known to be able to sustain high quality innovation by occupying strategic niches (Hall & Ziedonis,
2001; Agarwal and Audretsch, 1999). My results indicate that small ￿rms are indeed as successful
as large ￿rms in this industry, in terms of the average quality of their patents. Other factors aid the
success of small ￿rms, such as the abundant availability of venture capital in Silicon Valley, which
helped technology-based small ￿rms to enter the market with new designs and technologies, often
through entrepreneurial spin-o⁄s from larger ￿rms (Saxenian, 1994). The geographic location of this
industry also facilitates spillovers and entrepreneurial capital emanating from nearby universities.
The ￿nding that small ￿rms are not better innovators than large ￿rms may be an indication that
small and large ￿rm success is highly interdependent in this industry. For instance, Rothwell
(1983, 1989) argues that semiconductor innovation thrives on synergies (which he calls ￿dynamic
14complementarities￿ ) between small and large ￿rms. Similar arguments have also been raised by
Pavitt & Wald (1971) and Acs & Audretsch (1988) in di⁄erent contexts.
5 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
In the current chapter it has been observed that the response of R&D productivity to ￿rm size is
not homogenous among two of the most R&D-intensive industries. A natural next step to take is
to study the causes of this discrepancy. A promising point of departure for future work is to exploit
the "technology regimes" concept of Winter (1984). In Winter (1984), industrial conditions that
favor small ￿rm and large ￿rm innovation are characterized by the so-called entrepreneurial regime
and routinized regime, respectively. Acs & Audretsch (1990) ￿nd some evidence for the existence
of these regimes using data on innovation counts. These observations are also in line with the
often cited innovation patterns that large ￿rms are likely to be the sources of minor, incremental
innovations, while the majority of major, radical innovations come from small ￿rms (Hamberg,
1966).
On a related note, further research will also need to take additional characteristics of these
two industries, and characteristics of the particular technologies into account. Research in these
directions is somewhat disadvantaged due to data constraints and a lack of empirical measures for
detailed technological characteristics. For instance, it is di¢ cult (but necessary) to have empirical
measures that describe to what extent innovations are "radical", or "cumulative" in a given industry.
The e⁄ects of the major episodes these two industries went though during the period in question
needs to be examined as well. While results of the current paper add important insights, the analyses
are admittedly "aggregate" in the sense that they include a large number of years spanning three
decades. Hence, more detailed studies of the two industries are called for, with particular attention
to various sub-periods, including a re-examination of both industries for more recent years.
6 CONCLUSION
This chapter performed empirical tests of the Schumpeterian hypothesis using U.S. data on phar-
maceutical and semiconductor industries. Two innovation indicators have been used as measures
of R&D outputs. These were citations received per patent, which is an indicator of the average
quality of a ￿rm￿ s patents, and citations received per R&D dollar invested, which is an indicator
of total output achieved per R&D dollar. It has been shown that citations received per patent
15(CP) falls with ￿rm size in pharmaceuticals. There is no signi￿cant relationship between average
patent quality and ￿rm size in semiconductors. On the other hand, citations received per R&D
dollar invested (CR) falls with ￿rm size in both industries. This latter result is in line with the
previous literature on the size determinants of patent yields (patents per R&D dollar invested)
and innovation counts. An important contribution of the chapter, therefore, is that quality and
quantity of invention may have di⁄erent determinants.
The chapter also studied the e⁄ects of technological diversi￿cation, generality of a ￿rm￿ s patents,
technological opportunity and spillovers on the two performance measures used in the chapter.
Among interesting results related to these set of variables is that there is an inverted-U type
relationship between technological diversi￿cation and average patent quality for semiconductors.
This implies that increased diversi￿cation initially increases patent quality, but hinders it if the ￿rm
is already highly diversi￿ed. In other words, while increased diversi￿cation is initially bene￿cial
to a semiconductor ￿rm, the ￿rm can also be ￿too diversi￿ed￿ . On the other hand, total value
generated per R&D dollar increases with diversi￿cation at an increasing rate in this industry.
Hence, too much diversi￿cation does not hinder a ￿rm￿ s total R&D output. On the other hand, we
observe no signi￿cant relationship between patent quality and diversi￿cation the pharmaceutical
industry, and observe a positive and linear relationship between total output per R&D dollar and
diversi￿cation in the same industry.
In terms of industrial research policy, my results suggest that subsidies for research and devel-
opment activities need to support innovative small ￿rms in these two industries, as small ￿rms are
found to publish higher quality patents in pharmaceuticals, and do not seem to have a disadvantage
in terms of quality in semiconductors. Hence, at the outset, a reallocation of subsidies from larger
to smaller ￿rms may be called for. However, further recommendation on whether and how these
reallocations should be performed will require more detailed insight into these two industries that
will come from more detailed empirical research.
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26KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Schumpeterian hypothesis: The claim that larger ￿rms in more concentrated industries have
better innovative performances. While the hypothesis speaks of both the size of the ￿rm and the
concentration of the industry it operates in, the economic literature has mostly focused on the
former.
Patent citation: A reference made by a patent on its front page to a previously granted patent,
indicating that the former (citing patent) builds on the knowledge embodied within the latter (cited
patent). Patent applicants have the responsibility to cite all relevant ￿prior art￿that they are aware
of. During patent examination, it is the patent examiner￿ s duty to make sure that all relevant prior
art is cited by the patent in examination.
R&D intensity: R&D expenditures of the ￿rm divided by a measure of its size. The size measure
is usually taken to be sales, but other indicators of scale (such as net capital, employment, or value
added) can be used. R&D intensity of a ￿rm quanti￿es its devotion to research and development
activities.
Technological diversi￿cation: A measure of the diversity of a ￿rm￿ s technological activities. In
the current chapter it is measured by an index that is based on the Her￿ndahl index of concentra-
tion. The index measures the extent that a ￿rm￿ s patents are ￿spread￿across di⁄erent technology
classi￿cations, rather than being concentrated into a few.
Generality: The generality index constructed and proposed by Trajtenberg, Henderson & Ja⁄e
(2002). It measures the extent at which a ￿rm￿ s patented inventions provide the foundations for
future patents. Trajtenberg et al (2002) motivate generality as an indicator of the ￿basicness￿of
an innovation by demonstrating that patents owned by universities score much higher scores in this
measure than patents owned by corporations.
Technological opportunity: A term describing all external factors that favor invention and








Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
log (CP)  2.471         0.747        .136      5.148 
log (CR)  1.168        1.222        -3.195         5.094 
log (Sales)  7.245         1.730        .948  9.529 
log (R&D Intensity)  -1.391        .811       -4.366         2.454 
log (Patents/R&D)  -1.245        1.111        -6.142         2.777 
log (Capital/Labor)  4.423         .469         3.158         6.551 
Generality  .329         .120  0   .764 
Diversification  .698         .281                 0  .958 
         
R&D Growth in Tech. Neighborhood  .075  .047  -.417         .4101 
log (Spillover pool)  9.500         .556         7.217        11.554 
          Notes: All dollar values are in millions of 1992 dollars, deflated using the GNP deflator. All logarithms are 









Deviation  Minimum  Maximum 
log (CP)  2.672         .736        .059         5.022 
log (CR)  1.825         1.182  -1.445      5.366 
log (Sales)  5.407         1.485        1.841       8.915 
log (R&D Intensity)  -1.374        .701        -4.258       .106 
log (Patents/R&D)  -.846        1.099        -4.074       2.582 
log (Capital/Labor)  3.902         .581  2.269       5.183 
Generality  .419         .163                 0  .876 
Diversification  .573         .338                 0  .970 
         
R&D Growth in Tech. Neighborhood  .072         .206        -.119       2.401 
log (Spillover pool)  9.813         .768         7.081      11.069 
          Notes: All dollar values are in millions of 1992 dollars, deflated using the GNP deflator.  All logarithms are 
natural logs. Sample size: 310.  Sample period: 1969-1992.  
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Table 3  
Pharmaceuticals 
Dependent Variables: log (CP) (Columns 1 and 2), and log (CP, non-self) (Column 3)  
Fixed Effects OLS 





log (CP, non-self) 
       





   (-3.69)
   (-3.27)
  
       
log (R&D Intensity)  -0.0845  -0.0916  -0.110 
  (-0.74)  (-0.74)  (-0.86) 
       





   (-2.95)
   (-2.91)
  
       
log (Capital/Labor)  -0.0267  -0.0476  -0.0293 
  (-0.21)  (-0.35)  (-0.21) 
       
Diversification  0.623  0.584  0.503 
  (1.44)  (1.30)  (1.08) 
       
Diversification
2  -0.290  -0.225  0.0646 
  (-0.62)  (-0.46)  (0.13) 






   (6.30)
   (6.15)
  
       
R&D Growth in Tech.  1.632
***  1.168  0.850 
Neighborhood  (3.35)
   (0.81)  (0.57) 
       
Spillovers | t - 1  0.640
***  0.682  0.539 
  (5.37)
   (1.02)  (0.78) 
       
Year Dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
       
Intercept  -2.103
***  -2.208  -1.311 
  (-2.61)  (-0.32)  (-0.18) 
       
R
2  .394  .434  .420 
N  362  362  362 
Notes: All logarithms are natural logs. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary form of heteroscedasticity. t 
statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
 




Dependent Variables: log (CP) (Columns 1 and 2), and log (CP, non-self) (Column 3)  
Fixed Effects OLS 





log (CP, non-self) 
       
log (Sales)  0.0710  -0.00598  -0.0197 
  (0.70)  (-0.05)  (-0.18) 
       
log (R&D Intensity)  -0.0369  -0.135  -0.124 
  (-0.45)  (-1.38)  (-1.28) 
       
log (Patents/R&D)  0.0892
*  0.0408  0.0187 
  (1.73)  (0.71)  (0.33) 
       
log (Capital/Labor)  0.193  0.242  0.239 
  (1.46)  (1.64)  (1.64) 





  (2.36)  (2.01)  (1.92) 






  (-2.55)  (-2.04)  (-1.83) 





  (9.42)  (9.53)  (9.77) 
       
R&D Growth in Tech.  0.203  -0.786  -0.770 
Neighborhood  (1.25)  (-0.85)  (-0.84) 
       
Spillovers | t - 1  0.205
*  0.0233  0.0417 
  (1.65)  (0.02)  (0.03) 
       
Year Dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
       
Intercept  -1.182  0.786  0.560 
  (-1.16)  (0.06)  (0.04) 
       
R
2  .290  .369  .371 
N  310  310  310 
Notes: All logarithms are natural logs. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary form of heteroscedasticity. t 
statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 




Dependent Variables: log (CR) (Columns 1 and 2), and log (CR, non-self) (Column 3)  
Fixed Effects OLS 





log (CR, non-self) 
       




  (-11.00)  (-10.56)  (-8.88) 
       




  (-7.68)  (-7.12)  (-7.13) 
       
log (Capital/Labor)  0.148  0.0453  -0.104 
  (0.94)  (0.28)  (-0.62) 





  (4.36)  (4.36)  (4.36) 
       
Diversification
2  -0.773  -0.819  -0.745 
  (-1.37)  (-1.40)  (-1.24) 





  (4.16)  (3.55)  (4.34) 
       
R&D Growth in Tech.  0.735  4.843
***  1.920 
Neighborhood  (1.25)  (2.87)  (1.10) 
       
Spillovers | t - 1  0.799
***  1.795
**  1.245 
  (5.55)  (2.25)  (1.52) 
       
Year Dummies  No  Yes  Yes 
       
Intercept  -2.015
**  -12.00  -8.078 
  (-2.05)  (-1.44)  (-0.94) 
       
R
2  .509  .551  .570 
N  362  362  362 
Notes: All logarithms are natural logs. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary form of heteroscedasticity. t 
statistics in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 




Dependent Variables: log (CR) (Columns 1 and 2), and log (CR, non-self) (Column 3)  
Fixed Effects OLS 





log (CR, non-self) 
       




  (-5.78)  (-6.06)  (-5.85) 
       




  (-4.04)  (-4.66)  (-7.41) 
       
log (Capital/Labor)  0.328  0.387
*  0.485
** 
  (1.51)  (1.72)  (2.34) 
       
Diversification  0.871  0.968  0.863 
  (1.41)  (1.61)  (1.56) 






  (2.58)  (2.29)  (2.50) 





  (3.40)  (4.37)  (5.86) 
       
R&D Growth in Tech.  0.136  0.712  0.915 
Neighborhood  (0.51)  (0.50)  (0.70) 
       




  (3.71)  (2.38)  (3.12) 
       
Year Dummies  No  Yes  Yes 





  (-2.83)  (-2.25)  (-3.16) 
       
R
2  .369  .512  .575 
N  310  310  310 
Notes: All logarithms are natural logs. Standard errors are robust to arbitrary form of heteroscedasticity. t 
statistics in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01 
 